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The relationship between religion and politics, between
church and state, has been a well rehearsed issue in Mus-
lim thought and practice, because Islam emerged fully
into history as a dual tradition of church and state, and
because as such Muslims have been less sanguine than
Europeans about making a rigid separation between the
secular and the sacred, or between the public and pri-
vate domain. By virtue of such history and by reason of
the subsequent Western secular expansion in the Mus-
lim world, there is widespread reaction to the legitimacy
of national secular governments among contemporary
Muslims. Some of that reaction goes back to the effects
of colonial rule.
Religion, Politics,
and the Islamic
Response in Africa
The Colonial Legacy
The Western colonial encounter with Muslim
Africa had a direct impact on the pre-colonial
legacy of church-state relations. In general the
encounter helped strengthen the tradition of
Muslim religious and political integration, either
through direct provocation or through concilia-
tion and collaboration. Thus the British invasion
of north Nigeria provoked resistance among the
guardians of the Muslim theocratic state found-
ed in 1804, forcing the British to use conciliation
and concessions to overcome that resistance
and legitimize their power. The British proceed-
ed to cut a deal with Muslim leaders: there
would be no undue interference in religious
institutions and local customs, but instead the
colonial administration would work through
those religious structures to govern the people.
In effect, Muslims would become co-partners in
the colonial enterprise.
The French colonial policy was a variation of
the British one. In theory, the French demanded
total surrender and commitment from their
Muslim subjects, setting up the colonial bureau-
cratic state to reformulate and regulate Muslim
affairs, with military muscle added for demon-
strated effect. In practice, however, bureaucratic
or military confrontation was too costly a way to
achieve permanent subjugation, and so the
French decided to invest in the Muslim rosary
and the ink pot to reach the hearts of the people.
As a result, pious saintly figures were courted
and patronized; they were invited to state func-
tions. sent on pilgrimage to Mecca at state
expense, and treated to lavish official blandish-
ments. Muslim learning was endowed, schools
supported, colonial administrators trained in
Arabic language and literature and in Islamic
subjects, Arabic works collected and translated,
and libraries furnished with Islamic books, man-
uscripts and journals. By thus identifying them-
selves with IslamÕs intellectual and educational
heritage, the French hoped to earn the lasting
gratitude and respect of their Muslim subjects,
which in many significant places they were able
to do.
Yet it became clear that this policy of colonial
reinforcement was contradictory, because the
justification of colonial rule as the transmitter of
Western enlightenment and progress sat awk-
wardly with the contrasting logic of the colonial
system as the propagator of Islam. Ultimately,
colonial rule would have to abdicate to the Mus-
lim agents it had successfully raised and trained,
handing over to them the fruits of power and the
machinery of a modern state.
Thus both in the British and French cases, the
Muslim religious and political impulse was
strengthened with the decision to conciliate and
reward. A certain identity of interest came to
exist between administrators and Muslim lead-
ers, allowing the imperial overlords to press one
of two options: either colonial rule could contin-
ue through strategic alliance with Muslim struc-
tures and institutions, or else it could cease for-
mally through an equally strategic handing over
to predisposed Muslim elites. In so far as Britain
had an official Muslim policy, one colonial
authority described it in the 1870s as follows:
ÔThe Mohammedan question is regarded by the
Government as one of the most important in the
future of west and Central Africa. If Islam is prop-
erly understood, if its youth inoculated with
British civilisation and British ideas are utilised by
British administrators and merchants, it will give
England a wider and more permanent influence
upon the millions of the Sudan than can possibly
be wielded by any other agency.Õ1 In the particu-
lar case of north Nigeria and its large and signifi-
cant Muslim population, the British targeted the
Muslim political elites, the emirs, as indispens-
able to this Islamic policy. The administrators
reasoned that Ôthe placing at the disposal of the
Emirs of the resources of an ordered State
inevitably strengthened and developed all
Moslem institutions in Northern Nigeria.Õ2
Colonialism became the Muslim shield, and
the riposte to the WestÕs religious minimalism. In
one example in British administered Adamawa
in Nigeria, the resident colonial officer presided
over a meeting called by Muslims who headed
the Native Authorities set up by the British. The
meeting would receive charges from the Mus-
lims against the Danish missionaries of the
province for allowing the classes for religious
instruction to be taken by village catechists in
mission schools. The meeting, held at Yola, the
provincial headquarters, considered how these
classes were in fact political platforms producing
Ôyoung rebelsÕ, i.e., a class of young people not
under the direct influence of the Muslim Native
Authorities. The colonial administration backed
the Muslim demands against missionary objec-
tions, for abolishing the religious instruction
classes.3 Thus colonialism became the Muslim
shield, and the guarantor of Islam as the public
alternative to Christianity for Africans.
The Roots of Controversy:
Integration or Separation?
The issue of integrating religion and politics
plunged post-independent Nigeria into a major
constitutional controversy when the military
government of General Babangida, who ruled
from 1985 to 1993, enrolled Nigeria as a member
of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). To
challenge that decision the Christian association
of Nigeria (CAN) was formed in 1986 as an ecu-
menical grouping of Protestants, Catholics and
African Independent Churches. CAN issued a
statement protesting the federal government
backing for sharicah courts in north Nigeria and
asking for an identical public status for Christian-
ity. Yet CANÕs strategy of demanding privileges
for Christians comparable to those being offered
to Muslims set it on the Muslim side of the fault
line, with Christians wheeling and dealing on a
stage Muslims constructed for their own pur-
pose. For example, the Kaduna Branch of CAN
published a statement asking the government
to offset any concessions to the sharicah with
similar concessions to Christians by establishing
a Christian constitution based on ecclesiastical
courts.4 Muslims welcomed CANÕs platform,
forcing a catch-22 upon Christians by challeng-
ing them to say which they preferred, ecclesiasti-
cal canon law, English Common Law, or secular
law. The debate as it has been conducted in
Nigeria has been a one-sided affair in which
Muslims have taken the offensive and Christians
have reacted with high decibel slogans about
pluralism and multi-culturalism, and with strate-
gies of ecumenial unity striking for their
ephemeral, tactical skittishness. If, by contrast,
the example of Christendom and its disastrous
consequences for genuine pluralism and multi-
culturalism were available to Muslims, it might
calm passions and provide instructive lessons
about the liabilities of religious territoriality in
Africa or elsewhere. In that case, the secular
state, shorn of its anti-religious bias and con-
ceived as a pluralist apparatus, might be less
objectionable, and might thus remove any con-
spiratorial odor from Christian support for such a
state. It turns out, however, that events have pre-
empted the issue, with the regime of General
Babangida acting in 1989 to allow sharicah court
jurisdiction in the north, thus setting aside the
position taken by Christians.
International Muslim solidarity has aided and
abetted national efforts, and has distracted local
Christian attempts to respond to Muslim initia-
tives. After several years as an observer, Nigeria
in 1986 joined the OIC. The OIC was set up fol-
lowing the Third Conference of Islamic Foreign
Ministers in March, 1972 and was registered with
the United Nations in February, 1974. A number
of Islamic agencies was established within the
OIC whose religious mandate was stated as the
commitment Ôto propagate Islam and acquaint
the rest of the world with Islam, its issues and
aspirations.5 Membership in the OIC was limited
to sovereign nation states which are Muslim by
definition, although several states with minority
Muslim populations have joined, including
Benin, Sierra Leone and Uganda. However,
somewhat incoherently, India and Lebanon,
which have significant Muslim populations, have
not been allowed to join. In other respects the
OIC has applied stringent confessional criteria,
from deciding on the venue of its meetings to
granting economic assistance from its $2 billion
development fund and awarding scholarships.
However, such historical cooperation has not
removed all Muslim grievances, so that their
need for trans-national solidarity has pitted Mus-
lims against the West as the source and guardian
of the secular national state, a state that divides
Muslims and sets at naught the just claims of the
ummah.
Thus, in spite of differences of culture and lan-
guage, and in spite of a common desire to suc-
ceed economically, such religious groups are,
even in the West where they have chosen to
immigrate, in the words of legal manuals,
Ôbound together by the common tie of Islam that
as between themselves there is no difference of
country, and they may therefore be said to com-
pose but one dar [i.e., dar al-Islam, Ôthe abode of
fraternal IslamÕ]. And, in like manner, all who are
not [Muslims], being accounted as of one faith,
when opposed to them [i.e., Muslims], however
much they may differ from each other in reli-
gious belief, they also may be said to be one dar
[i.e., dar al-harb, Ôthe sphere of war and enmityÕ].
The whole world, therefore, or so much of it as is
inhabited and subject to regular government,
may thus be dividedÕ along these lines.6
C o n c l u s i o n
The intellectual challenge to the modern
West is whether it can conceive a modification
of the separation of church and state to allow a
degree of interdependence. Too much is at
stake in the importance of the State as a non-
corporate, non-doctrinaire institution to allow
it to fall victim to Enlightenment scruples
about not mixing religion and politics. The
pragmatist liberal scruple that proceeds upon
religion in the fashion of individual entitle-
ment and free speech is in one sense the spoilt
fruit of the original insight about keeping Cae-
sar and God separate, about ensuring religious
freedom against state power and jurisdiction.
That insight became twisted into religion as
individual enlightenment and free speech, as a
rights issue under state jurisdiction, in fact as a
matter of private, individual choice without
public merit. So Muslim critics are correct that
rights without God are meaningless, but mis-
taken to require from that a religious state.
Muslims are right that if we only have human
authority as final arbiter of human rights, then
there simply is no basis for saying one individ-
ual has rights of person and property against
the multitude: against the individual, the mul-
titudeÕs will is inexorable and final by reason
merely of numerical preponderance. Human
rights as such is meaningless in that environ-
ment precisely because the individual has
been assured no God-given rights. That is why
human rights must presume a public tribunal
insulated from the tyranny of numbers by
being grounded in faith in the divine right of
personhood, a faith that fosters the twin cul-
ture of rights and obligations, of freedom and
community. Yet we have to say that the reli-
gious view also needs qualifying. A church-
state integration is bound to threaten civil
society, so that in one move of state capture of
religion the brakes are removed from political
excess and in turn applied to freedom and
commitment, in effect pressing political expe-
diency into the service of a false absolute.
The modern West would do well to appreci-
ate the crucial role of religion and politics in
the Muslim world rather that to persist with
the secular liberal preference of Ôcommodify-
ingÕ religion for short-term political goals. Alex-
is de Tocqueville noted this tendency, saying
government by habit preferred the useful to
the moral and would, therefore, require the
moral to be useful. Muslim tradition represents
it differently, arguing for the proximity of
church and state on the grounds that religion
is too enmeshed in life to exclude it, though
historical experience suggests that integrating
the two damages both of them. Governments
that anoint themselves with religious warrants
endanger themselves. We need the safety wall
of separation thus to tame the State and to cre-
ate a public space for religion and also to foster
pluralism and minority rights. '
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